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QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION ON INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE FUNDING 
ABSTRACT 
Ralph E. McKinney, Aston University, Birmingham, UK 
Lawrence P. Shao, Marshall University, Huntington, Vl/V, USA 
This article takes a quantitative approach to build upon McKinney and Shao's (2008) qualitative 
contribution concerning resource a/location of indigent criminal defense programs. By compating public 
funds of multiple societies over time, we are able to add important knowledge surrounding property rights 
valuations using a new concept called GDP Indexed Purchasing Power Parity. The findings of this study 
show that GDP-PPP provides for better indigent criminal defense analysis than per capita figures. 
Keywords: Indigent Defense, Economic Values, Public Funds, Criminal Policy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the knowledge concerning valuation of indigent defense programs 
as presented in McKinney and Shao (2008). Using qualitative methods, McKinney and Shao compared 
different societies through literature to determine how " ... basic freedoms to participate within established 
societies including free will consumption of products and services ... " are valued. The conclusion reached 
was that "Most indigent defense programs are nonexistent during oppressive government establishments. 
But, as a society moves towards a free market economy, property protection becomes an essential 
. element of this new free market economy and causes a paradigm shift within a society's government." 
Property rights protection includes access to basic legal representation to protect individual interests 
against erroneous society allegations and ensure that proper legal procedures and proceedings are 
followed. Vvtiile basic rights are essential to free market economies, " ... Society wealth and a greater 
return on investments of public funds can dramatically shift a society's value of basic shared rights ... " 
The contribution of this paper will be a method to analyse financial information concerning indigent 
defense programs in multiple societies. The new method was termed GDP Indexed Purchasing Power 
Parity. 
2. LITERATURE DISCUSSION 
The original paper by McKinney and Shao (2008) provides a detailed analysis of literature surrounding 
indigent criminal defense ("ICD"). In addition, Smith and DeFrances (1996) note that, over three quarters 
of U.S. inmates charged with State and municipal offenses had depended on publicly funded ICO 
programs. Wthin the United States, ICO programs are crucial components of the criminal justice system 
(DeFrances & Litras, 2000). Brown (2004) notes ICD programs need adequate funding to operate fairly. 
However, many public officials have not committed to fully supporting these programs. McKinney and 
Shao (2008) mentioned that some decisions associated with public funds may be based on economic 
strategies focusing on returns on investments and benefit recoupment for the greatest number of 
individuals. Thus, resource allocation and budgets are greatly constrained by actual expenditures which 
require ICD providers to selectively determine amounts each accused indigent individual will receive 
(Brown, 2004; McKinney & Shao, 2008). In turn, disparity among individuals may result from decisions 
about resource allocation and scarcity. 
To illustrate these inequities and resource allocation, DeFrances (2001) used variants of per capita 
statistics to evaluate selective U.S. States. DeFrances notes Alaska outspent Missouri by fourteen ($14) 
dollars per capita. While per capita provides a basis of discussion, there are critical flaws concerning this 
analysis. For example: each State economy can vary drastically in relationship to other States in terms of 
per capita income, Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"), and purchasing power. These flaws become more 
definitive when comparing international ICD programs. For a comparative analysis, McKinney and Shao 
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(2008} proposed that a review of temporal uses and allocation of financial resources could be a relative 
base to understand how societies valued basic shared rights. 
To further examine these values, economic models and theories may be engaged. Elements of the 
Purchasing Power Parity ("PPP"), the Law of One Price, may be used to convert financial information into 
a separate numeric expression for each society (Fisher & Park, 1991; In & Sugema, 1995; Pedroni, 2001; 
Taylor & Taylor, 2004}. By comparing these single expressions, supposed exchange rates become 
invisible, thus allowing for easy comparison and data transportability. Taylor and Taylor (2004) noted that 
John Maynard Keynes ( 1923) cited a problem with PPP was PPP failed to reasonable account for taxes 
and fees on importation and exportation of products and services. Unlike most goods and services within 
many economic studies, ICD programs are self-contained: Neither importing nor exporting with 
consumption limited to an area by geography or jurisdiction. Therefore, this argument is moot. 
VV'ith PPP, each society has different values, and in some cases, no substitutive goods exist (Taylor & 
Taylor, 2004). VVith ICD, the measurement is the macro values a society places on rights as expressed in 
economic units. Fisher (2001) mentioned values are determined by the ability to purchase goods and 
services. As such, currency exchange is necessary only when trade is intended. V\/ith ICD programs 
trade is unnecessary. Hypothetically, exchange rates on ICD programs would not be necessary for 
comparison. Pedroni (2001) and In and Sugema (1995) reported post-Bretton Woods use of PPP has 
been difficult to correlate as exchange rates are floating in constant flux. Thus, calculations should be 
contained to one society prior to analysis. Dryden, Reut, and Slater ( 1987) used concepts of purchasing 
power parity to compare financial information without transforming information by market exchange rates. 
The concept was to evaluate items in relation to GDP. In relation to GDP, many comparisons use per 
capita figures. As previously mentioned, problems exist with these comparisons. Kravis, Heston, and 
Summers (1987) noted per capita figures can be subject to tremendous errors. Therefore, some other 
common unit for evaluation is essential for evaluating ICD. 
3. HYPOTHESIS 
The hypothesis is GDP Indexed Purchasing Power Parity {MGDP~PPP") provides a better platform for ICD 
analysis than per capita estimates. 
\Miile per capita estimates do provide general financial and economic assumptions of portability and 
comparability, ICD programs dramatically vary among jurisdictional boundaries. Examples of significant 
differences include a sentence of execution, population density, property rights, ability of individuals to 
participate in government, and individual economic opportunities. Because ICD programs are contained 
within a society, GDP-PPP offers a more realistic comparison of a society's contribution to protecting 
individual basic rights. GDP-PPP becomes a better measure when significant differences among 
societies exist. 
4. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE 
This paper uses quantitative methods to evaluate the values that certain societies place on basic rights 
supported by indigent defense programs. For analysis, specific information (e.g., population, 
expenditures, and income) for each society will be obtained from respective public records and 
organisational reports. In some cases, organisational representatives may be contacted to clarify 
information and to obtain additional insight into program perimeters. Representatives can provide 
additional assurances concerning information validity and reliability. Information will be statistically 
analysed to determine how each society compares and differs. Past quantitative analysis on indigent 
criminal defense programs (see DeFrances, 2001; DeFrances & Litras, 2000) has focused comparing 
budgets, population and per capita statistics. Wlile per capita statistics provides a basis for analysis, 
analysis beyond a common currency has not been done. Additionally, budgets can be modified altered or 
not funded. Therefore, this paper will illustrate a new method of information conversion, GDP-PPP, which 
bridges uncommon currencies. Through GDP-PPP, variables surrounding purchasing power will be 
minimized. For example, the price of a bread loaf is different in California, China, Kenya, and South 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, Volume 9, Number 3, 2009 120 
Africa. However, converting financial information into a single relative value unit similar to a Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) or purchasing power parity (PPP) calculation allows for such comparisons to be made. 
Therefore, applying GDP-PPP related calculations become the basis of comparison for this paper. 
5. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
According to the preliminary analysis found in Table .1, GDP-PPP provides a more comprehensive means 
for comparison. This is best illustrated by comparing ICD expenditures within the United States. 
TABLE 1: U.S. STATE AVERAGES 
AVERAGE GDP Population ICD Per Capita Per GDP-
Fiscal Year (in Millions) Expenditure GDP Capita PPP 
State ICD 
California FY 01-06 $1,490,407 35,394,550 $588,707,582 $42,108 $16.63 3.9500 
Colorado FYOS $213,326 4,662,734 $47,473,830 $45,751 $10.18 2.2254 
Connecticut FY 00-06 $177,397 3.456,868 $35,405,366 $51,317 $10.24 1.9958 
Georgia FY 05 $359,694 9,093,958 $94,227,081 $39,553 $10.36 2.6196 
Hawaii FY05 $54,863 1,264,468 $10,530,386 $43,388 $8.33 1.9194 
Iowa FY 00-06 $104,455 2,940,275 $22,670, 160 $35,526 $7.71 2.1703 
Kentucky FYOS $138,542 4,165,958 $31 ,498,410 $33,256 $7.56 2.2736 
Missouri FY 00-06 $197,284 5,712,700 $30, 185,670 $34,534 $5.28 1.5301 
Ohio FY 00-06 $407,643 11.421,478 $99,005,885 $35,691 $8.67 2.4287 
Texas FY 01-06 $887,271 22,285,498 $127,056,432 $39,814 $5.70 1.4320 
El Paso County FY 01-04 $18,558 693,265 $4,745,778 $26,769 $6.85 2.5573 
Vermont FY05 $22,745 619,282 $9,019,910 $36,728 $14.57 3.9657 
West Virginia FY 02-06 $50.044 1,803.154 $28,425,207 $27,754 $15.76 5.6800 
Wsconsin FY 00-05 $193,697 5,458,131 $67,241,873 $35,488 $12.32 3.4715 
Calculations: GDP-PPP: Calculation Is ICD/GDP x 10,000 
Sources: GDP - Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dept. of Commerce; 
Pooulation - Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau 
For example, ranking selected per capita indigent defense budgets in highest to lowest order are $16.63 
for California; $15.76 for West Virginia; $12.32 for Wsconsin; $10.24 for Connecticut; $8.67 for Ohio; 
$6.85 for El Paso County, Texas; $5.70 for Texas; and $5.28 for Missouri. This indicates that Missouri 
and Texas provide the least amount of support for indigent defense programs. El Paso County 
contributes an additional $1 .15 per capita than Texas to support ICD programs. Thus, these per capita 
conclusions are logical, verifiable, and reliable. Ranking the same selected societies using GDP-PPP 
from highest to lowest dramatically alters these conclusions. West Virginia is 5.6800; California is 3.9500; 
Wsconsin is 3.4715; El Paso County is 2.5573; Ohio is 2.4287; Connecticut is 1.9958; Missouri is 1.5301; 
and Texas is 1.4320. Connecticut has moved near the bottom of the list while El Paso has move up. 
Table 2 illustrates the differences in ranking per capita and GDP-PPP. 
TABLE 2: PER CAPITA RANK AND GDP-PPP RANK 
California $16.63 West Virginia 5.6800 
West Virginia $15.76 California 3.9500 
Wisconsin $12.32 Wisconsin 3.4715 
Connecticut $10.24 El Paso County 2.5573 
Ohio $8.67 Ohio 2.4287 
Iowa $7.71 Iowa 2.1703 
El Paso County $6.85 Connecticut 1.9958 
Texas $5.70 Missouri 1.5301 
Missouri $5.28 Texas 1.4320 
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Rank order is directly attributed to the variances of purchasing power within each society. Instead of using 
per capita to measure micro differences, GDP-PPP measures macro differences that may be used to 
convert per capita figures. This concept may be illustrated by comparing Texas and El Paso County. The 
GDP-PPP difference was 1.1253 which indicates that El Paso contributed 78.5% more than Texas. To 
match El Paso contributions, Texas would need to spend $10.18 per capita. Using GDP-PPP vast 
differences are expressed in relative value units. 
From these calculations, comparisons can be made concerning the macro values of basic shared rights 
that a society is willing to support. The following formula will convert GDP-PPP to local currency: 
(1) SUBJECT I BASE* BASE PER CAPITA IDC 
Another way to depict differences in per capita and GDP-PPP is presenting information within a scatter 
plot graph where the per capita becomes the y-axis and GDP-PPP the x-axis. Using this analysis which 
represents about twenty-five percent of U.S. states, most societies center around Ohio: Between $6 and 
$11 and 1.800 to 2.750. However, this does not explain why West Virginia and California are the points 
furthest away. Results may be different if the remaining states and other U.S. societies were added. 
TABLE 3: U.S. DISTRIBUTION USING PER CAPITA AND GDP~PPP 
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To further illustrate the application of GDP-PPP, Table 4 presents financial information on several 
international ICD programs. Since information is presented in local currencies, per capita ICD cannot be 
directly analysed, as these currencies are not expressed in common units. This inability to directly 
compare per capita ICD of several currencies can be applied to common currency jurisdictions (i.e., Table 
1) as differences exist within these societies. Therefore, converting financial information into a common 
relevant unit by means of GDPwPPP is necessary for a more reliable analysis. 
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TABLE 4: INTERNATIONAL AVERAGES 
AVERAGE GDP Population ICD Per Capita Per GDP-
Fiscal (In Billions) Expenditures GDP Capita PPP 
Countrv Year ICO 
Argentina FY07 812.46 39,356,000 117,760,965 2,064.38 2.99 1.4494 
Austria* FYOO 257.30 8,263,000 17,700,000 31, 138.21 2.14 0.6879 
Belgium* FY 06 317.121 10,585,000 29,959,.47 29,959.47 4.08 1.3603 
Bolivia FY 00-06 24,363.00 9,026,000 5,962,101 269,920.23 0.66 0.0024 
Brazil FY 03-05 1,130.28 186,480,532 383.130,655 606.11 2.11 3.4782 
Canada• FY 00-06 1,184.33 31 ,883,484 581,589,714 37,145.56 18.24 4.9105 
Chile FY 02-06 54,324.44 15,993,800 19,110,969 3,396,593.81 1.19 0.0035 
Columbia FY 01-06 223,087.33 42,120,996 51,791 ,908,333 5,296,345.08 1,229.60 3.3216 
Costa Rica FY 01-06 1,628.02 3,927,289 4,512,000 414,540.41 1.15 0.0277 
Dominican Republic FY05-06 276.03 7,280,000 70,445,531 37,916.62 9.68 2.5521 
England & Wales FY 01-05 889.03 52,758,920 1,064,400,000 16,850.80 20.17 11 .9726 
Finland* FY06 167.041 5,266,000 55,105,000 31 ,720.66 10.46 3.2989 
France* FY 06 1,808.84 61,353,000 303,000,000 29,482.44 4.94 1.6751 
Germany* FY 06 2,321 .50 82,293,000 557,000,000 28,210.18 6.77 2.3993 
Greece* FY 06 213.99 11,123,000 1,700,000 19,238,07 0.15 0.0794 
Honduras FY 00-06 121,.59 6,892,143 53,794,151 17,642.26 7.81 4.4241 
Ireland* FY06 177.286 4,240,000 63,600,000 41,812.74 15.00 3.5874 
Italy* FY06 1,479.98 58,435,000 86,562,704 25,326.96 1.48 0.5849 
Japan FY07 515,475.20 127,757,000 20,000,000,000 4,034,809.83 156.55 0.3880 
Luxembourg* FY 06 33.852 473,000 2,949,983 71,568.71 6.24 0.8714 
Netherlands* FY 01 426.01 16,017,445 262,000,000 26,596.56 16.36 6.1501 
Netherlands* FY 06 539.93 16,346,000 344,666,748 33,031.26 21 .09 6.3836 
Portugal* FY06 155.45 10,570,000 35,829,192 14,706.34 3.39 2.3049 
South Africa FY 00-02 950.55 45,572,422 270,333,333 20,857.94 5.93 2.8440 
Spain* FY06 982.30 44,068.000 167,331,526 22,290.62 3.80 1.7035 
Sweden FY 00-06 2.415.17 8,970,391 618,584,857 269,237.99 68.96 2.5612 
Venezuela FY 05-06 350,113.50 25,455,320 50,359,255,333 13,754,040.41 1.978.34 1.4384 
Source: International Monetary Fund, \/Vorld Economic Outlook Database, October 2008 (Reported in local currencies) 
Notes; England & Wales uses GVA obtained by Office of National Statistics 
• Includes civil aid 
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Table 5 integrates elements of both Table 1 and Table 4 to illustrate resources spent on ICD programs. 
TABLE 5: SOCIETIES RANKED BY GDP~PPP EXPRESSED IN LOCAL CURRENCIES 
Society GDP-PPP USO-Ohio Euro-Germany 
England & Wales 11 .9726 $42.74 33.78 € 
Netherlands (06) 6.3836 $22.79 18.01 € 
Netherlands (01) 6.1501 $21 .95 17.35 € 
West Virginia 5.9385 $21 .20 16.76 € 
Canada 4.9105 $17.53 13.86 € 
Honduras 4.4241 $15.79 12.48 € 
Vermont 3.9657 $14.16 11.19€ 
California 3.9500 $14.10 11.15 € 
Ireland 3.5874 $12.81 10.12 € 
Brazil 3.4782 $12.42 9.81 € 
Wisconsin 3.4715 $12.39 9.80€ 
Columbia 3.3216 $11.86 9.37€ 
Finland 3.2989 $11.78 9.31 € 
South Africa 2.8440 $10.15 8.02€ 
Georgia (USA) 2.6196 $9.35 7.39€ 
Sweden 2.5612 $9.14 7.23€ 
El Paso County 2.5573 $9.13 7.22€ 
Dominican Republic 2.5521 $9.11 7.20€ 
Ohio 2.4287 $8.67 6.85€ 
Germany 2.3993 $8.57 6.77€ 
Portugal 2.3049 $8.23 6.50€ 
Kentucky 2.2736 $8.12 6.42€ 
Colorado 2.2254 $7.94 6.28€ 
Iowa 2.1703 $7.75 6.12€ 
Connecticut 1.9958 $7.12 5.63€ 
Hawaii 1.9194 $6.85 5.42 € 
Spain 1.7035 $6.08 4.81 € 
France 1.6751 $5.98 4.73€ 
Missouri 1.5301 $5.46 4.32€ 
Argentina 1.4494 $5.17 4.09€ 
Venezuela 1.4384 $5.13 4.06€ 
Texas 1.4320 $5.11 4.04€ 
Belgium 1.3603 $4.86 3.84€ 
Luxembourg 0.8714 $3.11 2.46€ 
Austria 0.6879 $2.46 1.94 € 
Italy 0.5849 $2.09 1.65 € 
Japan 0.3880 $1 .39 1.09€ 
Greece 0.0794 $0.28 0.22€ 
Costa Rica 0.0277 $0.10 0.08€ 
Chile 0.0035 $0.01 0.01 € 
Bolivia 0.0024 $0.01 0.01 € 
McKinney and Shao (2008) noted Lord Carter asserted that England and Wales spend more on ICD than 
any other nation. V\lhile Lord Carter expressed his statement in per capita spending, Table 5 supports his 
assertion that England and Wales do attribute more to ICD programs. However, translating GDP-PPP to 
local currencies would provide practical examples. 
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Since Ohio appears to be a central point {see Table 3). Ohio becomes the base for translating GDP-PPP 
into U.S. dollars. This is denoted as USO-Ohio. The average USO-Ohio was $9.49. To provide another 
example, Germany was selected based on ranking near the center of GDP-PPP societies. The average 
Euro-Germany was 7.50€. While mapping the societies that coupled civil legal aid with ICD programs, a 
geographic pattern within Europe was noted: Western and north-western societies appear to contribute 
significantly more resources towards these programs while eastern societies significantly contribute less. 
While some public funds for civil legal aid are available in the U.S., the administration of civil legal aid is 
separate from ICD programs. 
GDP-PPP converted into USO-Ohio and Euro-Germany provides an enhanced view of how other 
societies attribute resources to IDC programs. The benefit of GDP-PPP is the simplicity of using a limited 
number of calculations and estimates. With more estimates and calculations, greater opportunities for 
errors exist. E~change rates and standard of living adjustments are not necessary for conversion. Thus, 
GDP-PPP can demonstrate costs of other ICD programs from a central standpoint as seen in both 
conversions. 
While GDP-PPP results are an improvement over per capita results, GDP-PPP suffers from the same 
pitfalls as GDP. For example: underground economies, owner consumed production (i.e., farming, 
textiles), and unpaid labor are not reflected within GDP estimates. Likewise, rapid inflation and shifts in 
government paradigms can alter GDP. Wiile these variables can cause deviations within GDP estimates, 
these are normally acceptable and minimal deviations. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Considering the noted differences between presented per capita and GDP-PPP data, GDP-PPP analysis 
provides a better platform for measuring a society values surrounding funding of basic rights. Because 
GDP-PPP allows comparisons across currencies and incomes, global funding comparisons of basic rights 
protected by ICD programs can be undertaken. As illustrated, using GDP-PPP can provide a basis for 
conversion into local currencies to better illustrate and compare society expenditures. 
GDP-PPP establishes a simple measurement that comprehensively covers self-contained programs such 
as ICD programs. To expand these findings, future research can add societies not presented and expand 
the temporal boundaries of societies presented. While this research cannot explain differences among 
societies, we can offer some variables that may be integrated within the existing literature. Since ICD 
programs are legal aid for the poor, the wealth of a society can significantly determine how funds are 
distributed. 
Political influences can contribute to what is considered a criminal offense and which individuals would be 
eligible for legal aid. Therefore, evaluation of case load statistics (e.g., death penalty cases) would 
provide a deeper understanding of the criminal offenses being committed against a society and how the 
society treats those offenses. The societies (see Table 4) supporting civil legal aid with ICD programs 
appear to take a more holistic approach towards treating an individual. However, individual program 
evaluations would be necessary to determine to what extent an individual's economic situation is treated. 
Geographic differences may influence political differences which may account for some patterns in GDP-
PPP as noted in funding among certain E.U. societies. 
Finally, GDP-PPP may be used to compare other governmental programs to facilitate and further 
understand financial choices among societies. We believe additional research will only strengthen our 
conclusion that GDP-PPP is a better financial tool for comparisons among societies than per capita 
comparisons. 
REFERENCES: 
Brown, D. K., "Rationing criminal defense entitlements: an argument from institutional design," Columbia 
Law Review. vol. 104 no. 2, 2004, 801-835. 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, Volume 9, Number3, 2009 125 
Centro de Estudios de Justicia de Las Americas (CEJA), Reporte de la Justicia, tercera edicion, (2006-
2007); Providencia, Santiago, Chile: CEJA. 
DeFrances, C. J., State-Funded Indigent Defense Services, 1999 (NCJ Publication No. 188464), 
Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, 2001 . 
Defrances, C. J ., & Utras, M. F. X., Indigent Defense Services in Large Counties, 1999 (NCJ Publication 
No. 184932), Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs, U.S. DOJ, 2000. 
Dryden, J., Reut, K., and Slater, B., "Comparison of purchasing power parity between the United States 
and Canada," Monthly Labor Review, vol. 110 no. 12, 1987, 7-24 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), European Judicial Systems. 3rd ed., 
Belgium: CEPEJ, 2008. 
Fisher, E. 0 . "Purchasing power parity and interest parity in the laboratory," Australian Economic Papers, 
vol. 40 no. 4, 2001, 586-602 
Fisher, E. 0. and Park, J. Y., "Testing purchasing power parity under the null hypothesis of co-
integration," The Economic Journal, vol. 101 no. 409, 1991, 1476-1484 
In, F., & Sugema, I, ''Testing purchasing power parity in a multivariate conintegrating framework," Applied 
Economics, vol. 27 no. 9, 1995, 891-899 
Kravis, I. 8., Heston, A. W., & Summers, R. (1987). "Real GDP per capita for more than one hundred 
countries," The Economic Journal, vol. 88 no. 350, 1987, 215-242 
McKinney, R. E., & Shao. L. P. (2008). "Indigent criminal defense: qualitative review on economic value," 
European Management Journal, vol. 8 no. 3, 2008, 146-152 
Pendroni, P., ''Purchasing power parity tests in cointegrated panels," The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, vol. 83 no. 4, 2001, 727-731. 
Smith, S. K., & DeFrances, C. J. Indigent Defense, 1996 {NCJ Publication No. 158909), Washington, DC: 
Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, 1996. 
Spangenberg Group, State and County Expenditures for Indigent Defense Services in Fiscal Year 2005, 
2006 (ABA Publication), West Newton, MA: The American Bar Association Bar Information 
Program. 
Taylor, AM., and Taylor, M. P. "The purchasing power parity debate," Journal of Economic Perspectives. 
vol. 18 no. 4, 2004, 135-158. 
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND NOTES 
The authors wish to acknowledge the following organizations and individuals for their assistance with this 
research: For U.K. information - The Crown, Office for national Statistics and the Ministry of Justice; 
Harald Solvang for Sweden; Sarah Aguilar for El Paso County; Priscilla Kokinis for Connecticut; Kathryn 
Smith for Ohio; Megan Christiansen for Wisconsin; and Bang Lee for assisting with information collection. 
If we have missed anyone, we apologize. 
Information on ICD expenditures have come from several sources. Wth space limitations, anyone wishing 
to obtain sources or additional information please contact the authors. 
AUTHOR PROFILES: 
Professsor Ralph E. McKinney is a doctoral candidate at Aston Business School at Aston University 
and an Adjunct Professor of Finance and Economics at the Lewis College of Business at Marshall 
University. Professor McKinney's general research interests include decision theory, selection and 
assessment, labor related issues, and poverty. 
Dr. Lawrence P. Shao is Professor of Finance at the Lewis College of Business at Marshall University. 
He has travelled extensively abroad and has lectured in Canada, England, India, Mexico, Taiwan and the 
Czech Republic. Dr. Shao has authored over thirty five refereed journal articles and books dealing with 
international business and finance. 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT; Volun1e 9, Number 3, 2009 126 
